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Financial Crisis, Firm Dynamics, and Aggregate Productivity in Japan 
 
1. Introduction 
Financial crises have serious impacts on the real economy. However, their 
impacts on firms are different between more and less productive firms or between 
entrants and incumbents. We investigate the impacts of a financial crisis on 
heterogeneous firms and their aggregate consequences based on the Japanese 
financial crisis in the 1990s. 
Japan’s decade-long stagnation in the 1990s, the “lost-decade,” has attracted 
the attention of many researchers. Though there have been long debates over the 
causes of the stagnation, most of the researchers agree with the following “stylized 
facts” concerning the 1990s’ Japanese economy. 
1) Banks incurred huge losses from nonperforming loans until 2002 (Figure 1). 
2) Firm turnover ratios, especially the entry rate, decreased significantly (Figure 2). 
3) Aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) slowed down (Figure 3) 1. 
4) The aggregate investment-to-output ratio did not show a declining trend, aside 
from cyclical movements (Figure 4). 
We try to explain these facts consistently. Our hypothesis is as follows. Huge 
losses from nonperforming loans at banks raised financial intermediation costs, 
which seriously affected new entrants and productive firms who were willing to 
invest, resulting in a low firm-turnover ratio, misallocation of capital, and low 
aggregate productivity. To quantitatively assess these effects, we use a dynamic 
general equilibrium model of firm dynamics that incorporates financial 
intermediation costs, and we calibrate it to the Japanese economy during the 
banking crisis period. 
We focus on the deterioration of bank health and assess its impact on the 
aggregate economy. Though there are some other factors that raised external 
financing costs in the 1990s’ Japanese economy, including the deterioration of firm 
net worth due to the asset market collapse and the high real interest rates due to 
price deflation, focusing on bank health seems a natural first step given the huge 
amount of nonperforming loans at banks and the vast literature on their impacts on 
firm activities. Our model with financial intermediation costs fits well with the 
analysis of the banking crisis in Japan.   
Our results suggest that differential impacts of financial intermediation costs 
                                                  
1  Most growth accounting studies report a productivity slowdown in the 1990s, with the 
exception of Kawamoto (2004). 3 
 
on heterogeneous firms are essential to understanding the aggregate consequences 
of banking crises. Because high financial intermediation costs are harmful, 
especially to entrants and highly productive firms, firm turnover and aggregate 
productivity is depressed. Our calibration shows that the deterioration of bank 
health decreased aggregate TFP by 0.4 to 0.6 percent, which corresponds to about 
20 to 30 percent of the actual decline in the de-trended TFP during the banking 
crisis period (1996-2002). We also show that the aggregate share of investment does 
not decline even with a significant rise in the proportion of financially constrained 
firms. 
Previous studies focus on one or some of the above facts, but few studies 
account for all of them. For example, many researchers point out that the banking 
problems caused the stagnation in the 1990s. One strand of the literature stresses 
the credit crunches by banks and under-investment by profitable firms (Gibson 
1995, 1997; Nagahata and Sekine, 2005; Hosono and Masuda, 2005). The others 
stress that the perverse incentives of banks led to the misallocation of credit and 
caused over-presence or over-investment by poorly performing firms (Peek and 
Rosengren, 2005; Ahearne and Shinada, 2005; Caballero et al., 2008; Fukuda et al., 
2006; Hosono and Sakuragawa, 2008; Nishimura et al., 2005).   
On the other hand, Hayashi and Prescott (2002), among others, shows that the 
output stagnation in the 1990s could be accounted for mostly by the decline in the 
TFP growth rate, and concludes that the “credit crunch” hypothesis could not 
account for the decade-long stagnation.2 
Caballero et al., (2008) and Tomura (2007) are closely related to this paper in 
that they link banking problems with aggregate productivity. Caballero et al. (2008) 
focuses on the credit misallocation due to the banks' lending to almost insolvent 
borrowers (“zombies”). Tomura (2007) analyzes endogenous fluctuations of TFP in a 
collateral-constrained economy (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). 3 Neither of them, 
however, assesses to what extent financial frictions can account for the TFP 
slowdown during the financial crisis period in Japan. Dekle and Kletzer (2003) 
apply an endogenous growth model with financial intermediation to the Japanese 
banking crisis and compare the qualitative dynamics predicted by the model with 
the data. However, they do not quantify those impacts, either. 
                                                  
2  Kobayashi and Yanagawa (2008) present a theoretical model in which a high 
probability of bank failure discourages ex ante investments (e.g., R&D investment) by a 
firm and lowers its productivity. Ogawa (2007), however, reports that nonperforming 
loans at banks had no significant effects on firm investment in R&D.   
3  Unlike Tomura (2007), we consider capital accumulation. 4 
 
Though we calibrate the model to the Japanese economy, our implication that 
a high financial cost during a crisis has a quantitatively significant impact on 
aggregate productivity through firm dynamics seems to be valid more generally. 
Caballero and Hammour (2000) asserts that crises freeze the restructuring process, 
such as job construction and destruction, and this effect is associated with the tight 
financial market conditions that follow.4 Some researchers have explicitly explored 
the impacts of financial frictions on the aggregate economy through firm dynamics, 
i.e., entry, aging and exit (Cooley and Quadrini, 2001; Cabral and Mata, 2003; 
Clementi and Hopenhayn, 2006). Others investigate the effects of financial 
development combined with occupational shifts on aggregate productivity through 
firm dynamics (Caselli and Gennaioli, 2003; Jeong and Townsend, 2007; Antunes et 
al., 2008). By focusing on financial intermediation costs during a banking crisis, this 
paper builds on those preceding studies that investigate the implications of 
financial frictions on the aggregate economy. 
This paper also contributes to the literature that is concerned with the effects 
of various policies on aggregate productivity through firm dynamics. Notable 
examples include Melitz (2003) for trade policies, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) 
for government interference with job destruction, and Guner et al., (2008) for 
size-dependent policies. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model with 
financing intermediation costs. We calibrate the model to the pre-crisis Japanese 
economy in Section 3 and show the results of the simulation in Section 4. We refer to 
this model economy as the “benchmark economy.” Section 5 compares the 
benchmark economy to the model economies with higher financial intermediation 
costs, which we refer to as “financially constrained economies.” Section 6 presents 
results from the alternative specifications in which entrants incur higher financial 
costs than incumbents. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
          To analyze the effects of financial intermediation costs on aggregate 
productivity, we present a dynamic general equilibrium model of firm dynamics 
based on Gomes (2001), which, in turn, is based on Brock and LeBaron (1990), 
                                                  
4  For the effects of recessions on restructuring, see also Caballero and Hammour (2005). 
For the implications of financial frictions on the propagation mechanism of business 
cycles, see Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Kiyotaki and 
Moore (1997), among others. 5 
 
Jovanovic (1982), and Hopenhayn (1992).5 
     There are firms, households and financial intermediaries in the economy. 
Firms need the services of financial intermediaries to obtain outside funds. 
Financial intermediaries operate competitively and provide these services at some 
cost. To allow for differential impacts of financial costs between more and less 
productive firms or between new entrants and incumbents, we assume that firms 
are hit by idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Thus we can analyze the impacts of 
financial costs on capital allocation and firm turnover. 
Firms and households are described in detail below. 
 
Firms 
    A  continuum  of  firms  produce  outputs  that can be consumed or invested. Figure 
5 depicts the timing of events. In every period, each incumbent firm observes 
productivity shocks, hires labor, produces output, finances and invests, pays 
dividends to consumers, and decides whether to stay or exit in the next period. 
        There is also a continuum of potential entrants that decide whether to enter or 
stay out. If an entrant decides to enter, it observes productivity shocks after 
entering the market, produces and invests just as an incumbent. 
    The production process is assumed to be required of a fixed cost and to have 
decreasing returns to scale. These assumptions imply a U-shaped average cost, 
which, in turn, implies a well-defined distribution of firms and endogenous 
entry/exit decisions. The production function is   
 
(1)   ) ; , ( t t t t z l k AF y = ,      
 
where  t y  denotes output,  t k  capital,  t l  labor, and  A is a productivity measure 
that is common across firms and constant across periods, while  t z  denotes an 
idiosyncratic productivity shock that is uncorrelated across firms. For incumbent 
firms, the idiosyncratic shocks have a common stationary and monotone Markov 
transition function  ) , ' ( z z Q   for the support over the bounded interval  ] , [ z z , where 
' z  denotes the next period shock. For new entrants, the idiosyncratic productivity 
shock is drawn from a common distribution  ) (z ϕ   over the same interval  ] , [ z z . 
                                                  
5  Cooley and Quadrini (2001) also establish an industry dynamics model with financial 
frictions, though the entry/exit rate is exogenous.   6 
 
     We  first  describe  the  firm’s  within-period decisions given the capital stock. The 
firm’s problem is to maximize profit, 
(2)   } ) ; , ( { max ) ; , (
0 f wl z l k F w z k
l − − =
≥ π  
where  w  denotes the wage rate and  f   a fixed cost of production that a firm must 
pay every period as long as it stays. We use profit and cash flow interchangeably 
hereafter. Specifying the production function in the Cobb-Douglas form: 
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    Next, we proceed to the firm’s dynamic problem. The next-period capital stock, 
' k , is accumulated as 
 
(7)   k k k k i ) 1 ( ' ) ' , ( δ − − = ,     1 0 < < δ , 
 
 where i   denotes investment and  δ   the depreciation rate. 
The firm incurs a financing cost of  λ  if it needs to raise funds from outside, 
i.e., if the profit falls short of investment.   
 
(8)   )) ; , ( ) ' , ( ( ) ; , ' , ( w z k k k i w z k k π λ λ − =   
 
The financing cost function is assumed to depend on the amount of external 
funds and to be positive and increasing for a positive range of external funds. We 
                                                  
6  We assume that labor is chosen optimally in every period given initial capital stock. If 
we instead assume that firm-specific human capital is accumulated over time, firms 
incur external financial costs to increase firm-specific human capital as well, which will 
cause labor wedge (the gap between the marginal productivity of labor and the marginal 
rate of substitution between leisure and consumption). Because this extension increases 
the number of state variables and makes the numerical analysis difficult, we chose a 
simple assumption, though introducing labor wedge would be a useful future work. 7 
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where  0 λ  and  1 λ  are positive constants. Figure 6 depicts the financing cost 
function. It seems natural to assume that significant economies of scale exist in the 
transaction costs of external finance; firms incur higher average costs when they 
raise smaller amounts. Actually, based on the evidence on the floatation costs 
associated with issuing new equity provided by Smith (1977), Gomes (2001) finds 
that external funding costs can be well-approximated by a linear function of 
Equation (9). In the case of bank loans, the borrowers will be burdened with some 
fixed costs for screening and monitoring that banks incur in order to decide whether 
to accept or reject borrowers’ applications. Introducing fixed financial costs induces 
a lumpy kind of investment as we shall see below. 7  
     The firm’s dynamic problem is to maximize the expected value of the 
discounted profits, which can be expressed recursively as 
(10) 
( ) { } ∫ × + − − =
≥ ) ' ( ) ; ' , ' ( , ' max ) ; , ' , ( ) ' , ( ) ; , ( max ) ; , (
0 ' z dz Q w z k v k w z k k k k i w z k w z k v
k
β λ π , 
where  β   is a discount factor. The first three terms represent the current dividend, 
profits minus investment spending, and financing costs. The last term is the 
expected next-period value; if the firm decides to exit and sells all its capital. We 
focus on the stationary equilibria, where all prices, aggregate quantities, and the 
distribution of firms across states are constant. Thus we assume that the wage rate 
is constant:  w w = ' .  
 Gomes (2001) shows that there is a unique value function  ) ; , ( w z k v  and that 
it is continuous and increasing in  ) , ( z k  and continuous and decreasing in w . 
Solving for Equation (10) results in the policy functions of the next-period capital 
and stay/exit decision. The capital accumulation decision is described as 
(11) 
( ) { } { } ∫ × + − − =
≥ ) ' ( ) ; ' , ' ( , ' max ) , , ' , ( ) ' , ( ) ; , ( max arg min ) ; , (
0 ' z dz Q w z k v k w z k k k k i w z k w z k k
k β λ π . 
In case the maximizer in Equation (10) is not unique, the firm chooses the minimum 
                                                  
7  The U.S. plant-level evidence shows the existence of lumpy investment (e.g., Cooper et 
al., 1999; Cooper and Hultiwanger, 2006). We see the lumpiness of Japanese firm-level 
investment in Section 5.   8 
 
value to avoid external financing costs if possible. The firm decides to exit if and 
only if 
(12)  ∫ < ' ) ' ( ) ; ' , ' ( k z dz Q w z k v . 
This exit decision implies a threshold value of the idiosyncratic shock  z, below 
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   Finally, we describe the entry decision of potential entrants; they enter as long 
as the expected value of discounted profits is nonnegative. The free-entry condition 
is thus 
(15)  ∫ ≤ 0 ) ( ) ; , 0 ( dz w z v ϕ , 
with equality if entry is positive. 
 
Aggregation 
          We now characterize aggregate variables. Let ) , ( z k μ   denote the mass of firms 
in the state  ) , ( z k  and  B   denote the mass of new entrants. For any set 
) , ( Z K = Θ , the law of motion for  μ   is given by 
(16)  ∫ ∫ Χ + Θ = Θ ) ' ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( )) , ( , ( ) ( ' z dz Q dz K B dz dk z k T ϕ μ μ , 
where 
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The first term on the right hand side of Equation (16) represents the mass of 
incumbent firms that move from  ) , ( z k  to Θ. The last term represents the mass of 
new entrants, who have no capital at the time of entry. Equation (17) states that the 
transition must be conditional on the firm’s staying in the market. 
   Given the mass of firms μ  in each state  ) , ( w k and the mass of new entrants, 
B , we can define the aggregate output, demand for labor, total profits, investment, 9 
 
financial costs, operating costs, and productivity, respectively as 
output: (19)  ∫ − − = Bf dz dk f w z k y w B Y ) , ( ) ) ; , ( ( ) ; , ( μ μ , 
labor: (20)  ∫ = ) , ( ) ; , ( ) ; , ( dz dk w z k l w B L μ μ , 
cash flow: (21)  Bf dz dk w z k w B − = Π ∫ ) , ( ) ; , ( ) ; , ( μ π μ , 
investment: (22)  ∫∫ + = ) ( ) ; , 0 ( ) , ( ) ), ; , ( ( ( ) ; , ( dz w z k B dz dk k w z k k i w B I ϕ μ μ , 
financial costs: (23) 
∫∫ + = Λ ) ( ) ; ), ; , 0 ( , 0 ( ) , ( ) ; ), ; , ( , ( ( ) ; , ( dz w z w z k B dz dk w z w z k k k w B ϕ λ μ λ μ  
fixed operating costs: (24)  Bf dz dk f w B + = Φ ∫ ) , ( ) ; , ( μ μ  
aggregate productivity: (25)  ∫ ∫ = Ω ) , ( / ) , ( ) ; , ( dz dk dz dk Ae w B
z μ μ μ  
    To derive Equations (19)-(25), we used the fact that new entrants who have no 
capital do not hire labor or produce anything, and hence incur the loss of  f  in the 
period of their entry.   
 
Households     
    Households are represented by a single agent who maximizes lifetime utility 
from consumption c and leisure  l − 1 . Household income consists of wages and 
dividends. Denoting the discount factor by β
~
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where  ) , ( ~ z k vt ,  ) , ( z k dt , and  ) , ( z k st  denote the price, dividends and the fraction 
of shares owned by the household, respectively. We assume that dividends are paid 
just after shares are bought. Because we focus on the stationary equilibrium 
described below, the assumption of a stationary equilibrium is implicit in this 
formulation. In the stationary equilibrium, the firm discount factor is equal to the 10 
 
household discount factor and the share price is equal to the firm value:  β β =
~
 and 
) , ( ) , ( ~ z k v z k v =  (Proposition 4 in Gomes, 2001). Since all the aggregate quantities 
and prices are constant in the stationary equilibrium, the consumer problem can be 
simplified into the following static problem, 
(27)  ) 1 , ( max
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We specify the momentary utility function following Hansen (1985): 
(28)  ) 1 ( ) log( ) 1 , ( l H c l c U − + = − , 
where  H   is a positive constant. Then, solving for Equation (28), we get the optimal 
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Stationary Competitive Equilibrium 
     In a stationary competitive equilibrium, all the markets clear, the free-entry 
condition (15) is satisfied, and all prices, aggregate quantities and the distribution 
of firms across states are constant. The labor market and goods market clearing 
conditions are 
(31)  ) ; , ( ) , , ( w B L w B L
S μ μ = , 
(32)  ) ; , ( ) ; , ( ) ; , ( ) ; , ( w B Y w B w B I w B C μ μ μ μ = Λ + + . 
    There exists a unique stationary competitive equilibrium with positive entry 
(Proposition 5 in Gomes 2001). 
 
3. Calibration 
          We calibrate the model to the Japanese economy. Though bank nonperforming 
loans began to increase in the early 1990s when land prices dropped sharply, the 
banking crisis did not become severe until after some regional and major banks 
failed in the middle of the 1990s (Hyogo Bank, Taiheiyo Bank and Hanwa Bank 
failed in 1995, 1996 and 1997, respectively.) The financial crisis culminated in late 
1997 and 1998 when Sanyo Securities, a large securities company, defaulted in the 
interbank market and one major bank (Hokkaido Takushoku Bank), one large 
securities company (Yamauchi Securities) and two long-term credit banks (Nippon 11 
 
Credit Bank and Long-Term Credit Bank ), as well as some regional banks, all 
failed. The financial crisis continued until the banks' nonperforming loans began to 
decrease in 2002.   
Considering these changes in bank health, we divide the period into the 
pre-crisis period of 1980-1995 and the crisis period of 1996-2002. One may want to 
divide the sample period before and after 1990 or 1991, given that stock and land 
prices fell sharply and the Japanese economy turned downward in the early 1990s. 
However, we divided our period to focus on effects of the banking crisis on the 
aggregate economy. We follow the procedure below. 
First, we calibrate the model to the pre-crisis aggregate data. The calibrated 
model economy is referred to as the benchmark economy. 
Next, we change the financial intermediation cost parameters to be consistent 
either with the micro evidence on the proportion of financially constrained firms or 
with the nonperforming loan losses incurred by the banks during the crisis period. 
The calibrated model economies with high financial intermediation costs are 
referred to as the constrained economies. 
Finally, we see whether the constrained economies can match the aggregate 
data in the crisis period, and how different the constrained economies are from the 
benchmark economy. 
      
Preference 
The marginal utility of leisure,  H , is determined by the fraction of workers in 
the population. The share of labor force in the working age population (i.e., aged 15 
and over) was 60 percent in Japan during the 1990s (Labor Force Survey), which we 
choose for  H . The intertemporal discount factor,  β , is set to  03 . 1 1  so that the 
annual real interest rate is 0.03, roughly consistent with the Japanese economy 
from the 1980s to the 2000s. 
 
Technology 
     To determine the output elasticity to labor,  L α , and capital,  K α , we have to 
consider the returns to scale. Miyagawa et al. (2006) estimates returns to scale for 
thirty-seven industries and found that a large number of industries show constant 
returns to scale. Considering their results, we set  95 . 0 = + K L α α . The average 
capital share in the 1990s and 2000s is 30 percent (JIP Database 2008), which we 
use as the value of  K α . Consequently, we set  65 . 0 = L α . 
     The fixed operating cost,  f , mainly affects the firm turnover rate. Figure 2 12 
 
shows that the share of entry firms decreased from 6.1 percent in the pre-crisis 
period to 4.4 percent in the crisis period. Therefore, we set  f  so that the turnover 
ratio becomes about 6 percent in the benchmark economy. 
          For incumbents, the stochastic process for the logarithm of the productivity,  z, 
is assumed to follow 
 
(33)  ' ' ε ρ + = z z , 
 
where   ' ε  follows a (truncated) normal distribution with mean zero and standard 
deviation  σ . In practice, we follow Tauchen and Hussey’s (1991) method for 
optimal state space approximations to normal random variables. If appropriate data 
is available, the parameters  ρ  and σ   could be calibrated to the serial correlation 
and standard error of the investment ratio,  K I . Unfortunately, we could not 
obtain micro evidence for the serial correlation of  K I  that would cover a 
sufficiently long period and large sample of firms to calibrate  ρ . Therefore, we 
borrow the parameter that is consistent with the U.S. firm dataset of Compustat 
(Gomes, 2001). In particular, we set  6 . 0 = ρ  . We calibrate σ  to match the 
standard deviation of  K I  for listed firms as reported in Hosono and Watanabe 
(2002), setting  05 . 0 = σ . For new entrants, the initial level of technology is 
assumed to follow a uniform distribution over the range that is the same as the 
incumbents. 
 
Financial Intermediation Costs 
     How  to  calibrate  financial  intermediation costs plays a key role in this model. 
  Figure 7 shows the interest rate margins between bank loans and deposits for 
Japanese banks. For the benchmark economy, we set the proportional financing cost 
( 1 λ ) to 2.2 percent, which is the average interest rate margin over the pre-crisis 
period. 
The fixed financing cost mainly affects the proportion of financially 
constrained firms. The investment literature has studied a number of indicators to 
identify a financially constrained firm, including dividend payment ratio (Fazzari et 
al., 1988), the existence of a bond rating (Whited, 1992; Erickson and Whited, 2000), 
firm size and age, and membership in a Japanese business group, keiretsu (Hoshi et 
al., 1991). 8   However, most preceding studies classify firms into financially 
                                                  
8  For example, Erickson and Whited (2000) uses the criteria of a Standard & Poor’s 
bond rating and find that among 737 manufacturing firms from the Compustat 13 
 
constrained firms and unconstrained firms a priori using those criteria, and do not 
estimate the proportion of financially constrained firms. One important exception is 
Gomes (2001), who reports that among U.S. listed firms (in the Compustat 
universe), 63 percent is estimated to be financially constrained. Given no 
counterpart number for the Japanese firms, we set the value of  0 λ  so that the 
proportion of financially constrained firms becomes close to 63 percent in the 
benchmark economy. Later, we change the financial cost parameters to see how the 
economy is affected by high financial intermediation costs. 
Table 1 summarizes our calibration procedure for the benchmark economy. 
 
4. The Benchmark Economy 
     We numerically compute the stationary competitive equilibrium given the 
parameters in Table 1, following the procedure described in Appendix 3. Before 
investigating the impacts of high financial intermediation costs, we check the 
performance of our model by comparing the benchmark economy and the Japanese 
economy during the pre-crisis period of 1980-1995. 
 
Aggregate Quantities 
Table 2 provides some aggregate statistics of the benchmark economy. These 
are reasonably consistent with the Japanese economy during the pre-crisis period. 
The investment-to-capital ratio and the firm turnover ratio almost coincide, which 
is not surprising given our calibration of the parameters δ  and  f , respectively. 
The highly nonlinear property of the model prevents us from exactly matching those 
quantities. In the benchmark economy, aggregate cash flow is larger than aggregate 
investment, just as it is in the Japanese economy. The share of financial 
intermediation costs in the benchmark economy is lower than the Japanese 
economy, which is not surprising given that we do not consider any other financial 
services but financial intermediation. The average Tobin’s Q of the benchmark 
economy is lower than that of Japanese listed firms, either because we do not 
consider any investment adjustment costs or intangible assets, because the actual 
data of Tobin’s Q is measured only for listed firms, or because the stock market 
overpriced firm values during the pre-crisis period. 
                                                                                                                                                  
database covering the years 1992-95, 459 firms are identified as constrained firms and 
278 firms as unconstrained. For Japanese listed firms, Nagahata and Sekine (2005) 
uses the criterion of whether a firm has ever issued a corporate bond, and finds that 
about a quarter of total firms has never issued a corporate bond. It should be noted that 
those studies focus on publicly listed firms.   14 
 
 
Optimal Firm Behavior and Classification of Firm Types 
     Because we look at the differential impacts of financial intermediation costs 
among heterogeneous firms, it is useful to classify the different firm types to see 
how their investment and exit decisions depend on firm type. 
Without financial intermediation costs, optimal firm behavior depends only on 
the current productivity shock, a signal of future profitability, and not on the 
current capital stock. However, with financial intermediation costs, optimal firm 
behavior depends on both. Current capital stock matters because it affects current 
cash flow. Figure 8 depicts the optimal next-period capital stock against the current 
capital stock. The upper lines show high levels of current productivity shocks and 
the lower lines show low levels of current productivity shocks. Depending on the 
optimal firm behavior, we can classify firms into four types. 
 Firms belonging to the first type make negative gross investment and do not 
borrow, but they stay in the market. We label them as “unconstrained” firms.9 
Firms with sufficiently large current capital and with relatively low productivity 
shocks tend to be unconstrained.   
 Firms of the second type make positive gross investment within their cash 
flow and do not borrow. We call them “constrained” firms. Firms with less capital 
stock and with lower productivity shocks are likely to be constrained. The 
constrained firms are severely affected by financial intermediation costs and tend to 
invest just enough to replenish depreciated capital. 
  Firms of the third type make positive gross investment beyond their cash flow 
and borrow from financial intermediaries. We call them “external financing” firms. 
Firms with less capital stock but with higher productivity shocks are likely to 
finance externally. Their investment is lumpy: a small positive shock to productivity 
induces a large jump of investment due to the fixed cost of financing.   
Firms belonging to the final type of firms sell out their capital stock and 
choose to exit; we label them as “exit” firms. Firms with very low productivity 
shocks are likely to exit.       
 
Financing, Size, and Productivity 
    Table 3 presents some key statistics for each of the four firm categories. It is a 
                                                  
9  Even unconstrained firms are actually affected by the existence of financial 
intermediation costs; they over-accumulate the capital compared to the economy, 
without financial costs, in order to save the financial costs that they may incur in the 
future. 15 
 
benefit of our model to see which firms are financially constrained. The share of 
financially constrained firms is 61.8 percent, close to our target in calibrating the 
fixed financial cost parameter to match the U.S. counterpart. Though the share of 
firms that raise external funds is as small as 1.2 percent, they account for a 
dominant proportion of aggregate investment. Many of the new entrants are 
classified in this category.10 
One of the most interesting cross-sectional implications of this model is that 
externally financed firms are the most productive, followed by financially 
constrained firms and then unconstrained firms, in terms of total factor 
productivity (TFP) and Tobin’s Q. The order of firm size in terms of capital stock is 
in the reverse direction: unconstrained firms are the largest, followed by financially 
constrained firms and then externally financed firms. The implication that small 
firms are more likely to be financially constrained than large firms is consistent 
with the estimation result based on the Corporate Financial Survey (Table A2) and 
most of the empirical evidence from Japanese firms. 
The exit firms are the least productive and their Tobin’s Q is lower than unity. 
Though there are some competing empirical evidence concerning whether exit firms 
were actually the least productive or not during the 1990s in Japan, our result is 
consistent with some empirical results showing that less productive firms were 
more likely to exit.11  
 
5. Constrained Economies 
5.1 Setting Financial Intermediation Cost Parameters 
     As we see in Figure 7, the interest rate margins did not increase during the 
crisis period. The average interest margins were 2.23 percent and 2.05 percent for 
                                                  
10  Financial Statistics of Corporations, the second quarter of 2008, published by the 
Ministry of Finance, which covers corporations capitalized at 10 million yen and more, 
report the proportion of firms that did not increase fixed assets. According to these 
statistics, the proportion of firms that did not increase their fixed assets during the 
second quarter of 2008 was 74.5 percent. Considering that this statistic does not cover 
small firms capitalized with less than 10 million yen, our result for the small 
proportion of externally financed firms seems to be reasonable. 
11  Griliches and Regev (1995) and Bellone et al. (2005) find that less productive firms 
were more likely to exit in Israel and France. For Japanese firms, some researches show 
that less productive firms were more likely to exit (Matsuura and Motonishi, 2005; 
Kiyota and Takizawa, 2006), though others find the opposite (Sekine et al., 2003; 
Nishimura et al., 2005; Fukao and Kwon, 2006). Different industries as well as different 
data sources seem to result in such a disparity. Unfortunately, we cannot estimate 
firm-level productivity using our dataset described in Appendix 2 due to lack of data 
that is necessary to estimate TFP. 16 
 
the pre-crisis and crisis period, respectively.   
     Nonetheless, the proportion of financially constrained firms seems to have 
increased during the crisis period. Actually, firms whose applications for loans were 
rejected by banks increased. The Small and Medium Enterprise Agency conducted a 
survey in December 2001 (Corporate Finance Survey)12 and asked whether firms’ 
applications for loans had been rejected by their main bank and other financial 
institutions over the preceding three years. According to the Survey results, among 
4,258 small- and medium-sized firms, 7.4 percent of firms, on average, were rejected 
by their main bank and could not find alternative financing sources during 
1999-2001. 
 Worsening financial conditions on the part of firms or decreasing collateral 
values may have at least partially caused the increase in financially constrained 
firms. However, because we want to focus on the effects of the deterioration of bank 
balance sheets, not firm balance sheets, we estimated the determinants of the loan 
rejection. Our estimation results show that the deterioration of bank capital 
increased the number of loan rejections by 17 percent to 23 percent (Appendix 2). It 
is reasonable to assume that the deterioration of bank capital increased financial 
intermediation costs and thus the number of financially constrained firms. 
There are some possible channels through which deteriorating bank health 
raises the financial intermediation costs. As vast empirical literature on credit 
crunches (e.g., Gibson 1995, 1997) suggests, poorly capitalized banks tend to tighten 
screening standards to meet the capital adequacy requirements. Firms have to 
spend more time, effort and resources to persuade banks to accept their loan 
applications. They may also have to engage in a costly search for alternative sources 
of funds. These costs are likely to increase fixed financial costs. In addition, banks 
that have to allocate their managerial resources to the management of 
nonperforming loans may spend fewer resources on processing borrower 
information on creditworthiness. In this case, banks may raise variable financial 
costs to cover larger potential losses due to lower quality of borrowers by raising 
interest rates and noninterest fees, or tighten financing conditions such as 
collateral or covenants. Instead of distinguishing these various channels, we simply 
raise fixed costs or variable costs of financial intermediation so as to be consistent 
with the micro data evidence of borrowing firms and banks to see their impacts on 
the aggregate economy. 
                                                  
12  The Corporate Finance Survey for the Japanese firms is similar to the NSSBF1993 
(National Survey of Small Business Finance) for the U.S. firms. 17 
 
  Specifically, we adopt the following two alternative approaches to account for 
the stable interest rate margins and the increase in the number of financially 
constrained firms,   
 In one method, we increase the fixed cost so as to increase the financially 
constrained firms by about 20 percent based on the estimates using the Corporate 
Finance Survey. We label this economy as the financially constrained economy A.  
The other method is to raise unit costs utilizing the nonperforming loan 
losses incurred by the Japanese banks. This experiment is reasonable given that in 
our model financial intermediaries are competitive and do not incur losses, while 
actual banks reported huge losses from nonperforming loans during the crisis 
period. For the period covering fiscal years 1997-2001 when aggregate loan loss data 
is available, the Japanese banks incurred 1.7 percent in loan losses per total loans 
on average. We raise  1 λ   from 2.2 percent to 3.9 percent. This economy is referred to 
as the financially constrained economy B below. 
By comparing the financially constrained economies A and B with the 
benchmark economy, we can find the effects of banking crises on aggregate 
productivity and other macroeconomic performance.   
 
5.2 Comparison of Financially Constrained Economies and the Benchmark 
Economy 
Table 4 compares the financially constrained economies A and B with the 
benchmark economy. We first focus on the constrained economy A. 
The share of financially constrained firms increases to 73.7 percent from 68.8 
percent in the benchmark economy, with a 19.3 percent rate of increase (19.3% = 
(73.7-61.8)/61.8), which is close to the target of 20 percent derived from our 
estimates using the Corporate Finance Survey. The firm turnover ratio, which is 
equal to the share of entry firms or exit firms in the stationary equilibrium, 
decreases from 5.8 percent to 4.0 percent. This decrease is consistent with the 
actual decline in the entry rate from 6.1 percent to 4.4 percent, though we do not 
calibrate the financial cost parameters to match the turnover ratio. 
Figure 9 compares the distribution of the firm-level investment-to-capital 
ratios of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Japan's manufacturing 
sector during the crisis period13 to that of the financially constrained economy A. 
                                                  
13  JADE, compiled by Bureau van Dijk from the Teikoku Databank database, is used to 
construct firm-level investment ratios. Jade contains financial statements of unlisted 
firms only from 1998. The sample covers 27,017 firm-year observations from 1999 to 
2002. For the details of the construction of the investment-to-capital ratio, see Hosono 18 
 
Unfortunately, the data for the pre-crisis period was not available. The model 
economy captures a distinguishing feature of the data: a large proportion of firms 
are inactive, and when a firm invests, it invests a lot. That is, investment is lumpy. 
Looking at the aggregate variables, we see that neither the 
investment-to-capital ratio nor the investment-to-output ratio changes significantly 
from the benchmark economy. This result suggests that the aggregate investment 
ratios are not informative with respect to the proportion of financially constrained 
firms. The actual investment ratios slightly decreased from the pre-crisis period to 
the crisis period. The aggregate productivity (TFP) of the constrained economy A 
decreases by 0.4 percent from the benchmark economy. As a counterpart of the 
Japanese economy, we linearly de-trended the logarithm of aggregate TFP and 
found that TFP dropped by 1.9 percent from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period. 
High financial intermediation costs account for about 20 percent of the actual 
decline in the de-trended TFP.   
  Why is the aggregate productivity of the constrained economy lower than the 
benchmark economy? Entrants and productive firms incur losses from high 
financial intermediation costs because they are more willing to raise capital 
through external financing. As a result, the real wage decreases so as to make the 
entrant’s firm value nonnegative (See the free-entry condition of Equation 15). The 
real wage is lower in the constrained economy A than in the benchmark economy by 
0.2 percent. On the other hand, less productive firms gain from the low real wage 
while they do not incur losses from high financial intermediation costs because they 
are less willing to raise capital through external financing. Consequently, less 
productive firms are more likely to stay in the market. The survival of less 
productive firms lowers the aggregate productivity and the firm turnover ratio. In 
sum, financial intermediation costs have differential impacts between more and less 
productive firms: they are harmful to more productive firms and beneficial to less 
productive firms. 
The actual de-trended real wage did not decrease but rather increased by 1.3 
percent during the crisis period from the pre-crisis period. However, the real wage 
often deviates from marginal labor productivity for various reasons. In Japan, a 
rising trend in the proportion of middle-aged workers contributed to widen the gap 
between the real wage and marginal labor productivity.14  
                                                                                                                                                  
and Masuda (2005).     
14  Hosono and Makino (2007) confirm this using industry-level data over the period 
1973-2002. 19 
 
Having explained how financial constraints have negative impacts on 
aggregate productivity in our model, we briefly compare our results with some 
relevant existing studies. Caballero et al. (2008) show that “zombie lending,” or 
loans to almost insolvent firms, raised factor prices and lowered factor mobility, 
which was harmful to productive firms. Tomura (2007) analyzes a 
collateral-constrained economy and finds that a tightening of collateral constraints 
lowers the price of land (collateral and production factor) and thus enables 
low-productivity firms to survive. Though exact mechanisms through which 
financial sector problems transmit to aggregate productivity are different among 
those two models and ours, all share a general equilibrium impact: financial market 
imperfections affect factor prices in such a way that high-productivity firms are 
negatively affected while low-productivity  firms  benefit.    
Next we compare the constrained economy B with the benchmark economy. 
The share of financially constrained firms increases to 83.5 percent and the firm 
turnover ratio decreases to 2.9 percent. The changes from the benchmark economy 
are somewhat larger than those of the constrained economy A. The other aggregate 
variables, including the investment ratio and the cash flow ratio, are almost 
identical to those of the constrained economy A. The aggregate productivity (TFP) 
decreases by 0.6 percent from the benchmark economy, which accounts for about 30 
percent of the actual decline in TFP. Though the quantitative effects on TFP are 
somewhat different between constrained economies A and B, both results suggest 
that a high financial intermediation cost results in a significant decrease in TFP 
without a significant change in the aggregate investment ratio.   
 
6.    Differential Financial Costs between Entrants and Incumbents 
     So far we have assumed that external financing costs are identical between 
entrants and incumbents. However, entrants may incur higher financing costs than 
incumbents, especially during the crisis period, for several reasons. First, banks 
may have to allocate more resources to the management of nonperforming loans 
and less to information processing concerning new borrowers’ creditworthiness. 
Second, banks may apply lenient screening standards to poorly performing 
incumbents and continue to lend to them in order to prevent reporting an increase 
in nonperforming loans by bank managers who are allowed to exert discretion in 
reporting nonperforming loans. Discretionary accounting practices seem to have 
been prevalent during the crisis in Japan (e.g., Peek and Rosengren, 2005). 
     In this section, we allow for differential financial costs between entrants and 20 
 
incumbents in two ways. First, we increase fixed financial costs only for entrants so 
as to increase the number of financially constrained firms by about 20 percent from 
the benchmark economy based on estimates using the Corporate Finance Survey. 
We label this economy as financially constrained economy C. We find that this 
target for the proportion of financially constrained firms can be achieved when we 
set fixed financial costs for entrants to 0.04, the same level as the constrained 
economy A, where both entrants and incumbents incur the same financial costs. 
Second we increase variable financial costs for entrants by 1.7 percent based on the 
average loan losses as a percentage of total loans, assuming that banks transfer 
losses from nonperforming loans only to entrants. We label this economy as 
financially constrained economy D. 
     Table 5 shows the summary statistics of constrained economies C and D as 
well as the benchmark economy. 
 In the case of constrained economy C, both cross-sectional and aggregate 
results are identical with those of constrained economy A. In particular, the decline 
in TFP accounts for about 20 percent of the actual de-trended decline during the 
crisis period. These results suggest that the impacts of a high fixed-financial cost on 
entrants tend to dominate those on incumbents.15   
On the other hand, the cross-sectional and aggregate results of constrained 
economy D are different from constrained economy B. Notably, while the proportion 
of financially constrained firms in constrained economy D is slightly smaller than 
that of constrained economy B (D: 83.3 vs. B: 83.5 percent), the decrease in TFP 
from the benchmark economy is larger in constrained economy D than in 
constrained economy B (D: 0.8 vs. B: 0.7 percent). The decline in TFP is associated 
with the decline in firm turnover ratio and not necessarily with the increase in 
financially constrained firms. Actually, the firm turnover ratio of constrained 
economy D is smaller than that of constrained economy B (D: 2.0 vs. B: 2.9 percent). 
The decline in TFP in constrained economy D accounts for about 40 percent of the 
actual decline in the de-trended TFP during the crisis period. However, it may 
somewhat overestimate the impacts of financial intermediation costs on aggregate 
productivity given such a drastic decrease in the firm turnover ratio. 
  
7. Conclusion   
                                                  
15  It is not always the case that the economy with a fixed financial cost only on entrants 
coincides with the economy with the same fixed financial cost on both entrants and 
incumbents. 21 
 
    
We quantitatively assessed the effects of the deterioration in the health of 
banks during the Japanese banking crisis on aggregate productivity through firm 
dynamics. Our results suggest that high financial intermediation costs significantly 
decrease aggregate productivity through depressed firm turnover and distorted 
investment decision making, while they do not decrease aggregate investment 
share. 
Though our model with intermediation costs could account for a significant part 
of the decline in aggregate productivity during the crisis period in Japan, there may 
be some other factors that raised firms’ financial costs, including the deterioration 
of firms’ balance sheets and the declining value of collateral. Analyzing those factors 
would reveal other sources of the TFP decline. A natural extension, therefore, is to 
extend the model to explicitly incorporate collateral constraints arising from 
imperfect contract enforcement and calibrate it to the Japanese economy. 
Our model can also be extended to allow for other distortions as well as 
financial frictions. Given the significant labor wedge in the 1990s’ Japanese 
economy that has been reported by some business cycle accounting studies (e.g., 
Kobayashi and Inaba, 2006; Inaba, 2007; Otsu, 2008), introducing labor market 
frictions may be a useful extension that could help explain the decline in aggregate 
productivity during the crisis period. 
Despite these limitations, this paper has the following general implications.  
Differential impacts of financial intermediation costs between more and less 
productive firms or between entrants and incumbents are essential to 
quantitatively understand their aggregate consequences. Because high financial 
intermediation costs are harmful to entrants and highly productive firms while they 
are beneficial to relatively unproductive incumbents, they decrease aggregate 
productivity through depressed firm turnover and distorted investment decisions. 22 
 
Appendix 1. Data 
Aggregate Data 
Aggregate output, investment, capital, labor and TFP are available in the JIP 
Database 2008. All these variables exclude public and housing sectors (i.e., “market 
economy”).  
Y = Real Output - Real Intermediate Input, 
K = Real Net Capital Stock, 
I = Real Investment Flow, and 
 L  = Divisia Index of Labor. 
    To derive the de-trended natural log function of the TFP series, we first 
construct the TFP level series by consecutively multiplying the TFP growth rates 
from the 1980 level, which we normalize to be unity, to year 2005. Then we regress 
the logarithm of TFP level by regressing it on the time trend: 
trend time TFP * 0102 . 0 027 . 0 ) ln( + = . 
We use the regression residuals as the de-trended ln(TFP). 
 
     Similarly, we obtained the de-trended ln(Y/L) by regressing the logarithm of 
labor productivity level (Y/L) on the time trend.   
      The share of financial services is derived from the JIP Database 2008 as 
Y / Λ = The share of real value added by financial industries (Industry 69) 
in the market economy. 
 
    Cash  flow  is  obtained  from  Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by 
Industry (FSSC) published by the Ministry of Finance. We adjusted the effects of 
sample changes and sample selection lag for the small firms to maintain the 
consistency of the time series data. See Hosono (2004) for details. 
 CF/Y  = (Operating income + Depreciation) / Value added. 
 
    The turnover ratio of firms with employees is from “Employment Insurance 
Annuals,” published by the Ministry of Welfare and Labor. 
  
Firm-level Data 
     For the descriptive statistics of the firm-level data of I/K and Q, we refer to 
Hosono and Watanabe (2002), whose sample consists of all the firms listed in the 
first and second sections of Tokyo Stock Exchange and other regional stock 
exchanges during 1971-99. Hosono and Masuda (2005) provide the SMEs’ firm-level 23 
 
data of I/K for the period 1999-2003, which we use for the comparison between the 
distribution of I/K and the financially constrained economy (Figure 9). 24 
 
Appendix 2. Estimation of the share of financially-constrained firms 
Data 
     To estimate the share of financially-constrained firms, we use theCorporate 
Finance Survey published by the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency in 
December, 2001. This Survey is similar to the NSSBF1993 (National Survey of 
Small Business Finance) for U.S firms. The sample firms were randomly drawn 
from the TSR (Tokyo Shoko Research) database. In the Survey, firms were asked 
whether their applications for loans had been rejected by their main bank over the 
last three years. When their loan applications had been rejected, they were further 
asked whether they could obtain funds from other financial institutions.   
     We obtain information about the firms’ financial statements and their main 
banks from the TSR database. The firms’ main banks are identified as the first 
financial institutions listed in the TSR database.16  
     T h e  Survey data is linked to the main banks’ financial statements that are 
available in the Nikkei Needs database, and the bank stock prices from the Toyo 
Keizai Stock Price CD-ROM. 
Our sample consists of the firms that satisfy the following three conditions. 
First, they are small or medium-sized enterprises as defined by the Small and 
Medium-sized Firm Fundamental Law.17 Second, their main financial institutions 
are major banks, long-term credit banks, trust banks, first-tier regional banks, 
second-tier regional banks or credit banks (shinkin) whose data is available. Finally, 
we restrict our sample to those firms that did not change their main banks during 
the 1999-2001 three-year period. This criterion is necessary to correctly identify the 
firm’s main bank. The number of firms satisfying these conditions is 4,258 and the 
total firm-year observations are 12.569.   
 
                                                  
16 The Corporate Finance Survey does not contain the information on the firm’s main 
bank. The first financial institution listed in the TSR database is regarded as the most 
important one by researchers of TSR, based on the information they acquire from the 
firm managers. As such, it should coincide with the most important one regarded by the 
firm managers. However, if the firm changes its main banks during the inquiry period, 
the researcher cannot track the past main bank. For this reason we exclude those firms 
that changed main banks during the inquiry period (Jan. 1999-Dec. 2001). 
17  Large firms are included in the sample of the Survey so that they occupy 10 percent 
in each industry. We omitted these large firms because the actual share of the number of 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is 99.7 percent (White Paper on Small and 
Medium Enterprise, Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, compiled from 
Establishment and Enterprise Census of Japan, 2001, Ministry of Public Management, 
Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications.) 25 
 
Probit Estimation 
     We estimate the determinants of the rejections of loan applications using a 
Probit estimation.18 We denote by  it R  the dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if firm i’s loan application is rejected by its main bank and other financial 
institutions in year t, and zero if accepted19.  it R is determined by  it R
* , defined as 
(A1)  it it it it it u lationship Bank Firm R + + + + = Re 3 2 1 0
* β β β β , 
where  it Firm  denotes the vector of firm i’s operational performance and other firm 
characteristics,  it Bank   the vector of the main bank’s capital condition, and 
it lationship Re  the vector of the relationship variables between firm i and its main 
bank.  it u  is a random variable drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero 
and variance 
2 σ . Whether the main bank rejects or accepts the firm’s loan 



















     F o r   t h e  Firm  variables, we use (1) EBITDA: earnings before interests, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortization, (2) SALES: sales as a proportion of the book value of 
assets, (3) DEBT: debt as a proportion of the book value of assets, (4) SIZE: the 
logarithm of the number of employees, (5) AGE: firm age, and (6) BUSINESS: a 
dummy variable that takes unity if firm i’s business conditions are better or 
unchanged, and zero if they are worse. AGE serves as the degree of informational 
transparency (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1995). It is, however, strongly correlated 
with the bank-firm relationship years (the correlation coefficient is 0.628) and hence 
partly captures the degree of relationship with its main bank. We expect that the 
firm is likely to be rejected if EBITDA, SALES, SIZE, AGE, and BUSINESS are low 
and if DEBT is high,   
As for the Bank  variables, we adopt (1) STOCK: rate of change in stock 
prices from March 1993, and (2) NPL: nonperforming loans outstanding as a share 
of total assets. Nonperforming loans are defined as the sum of loans to borrowers in 
                                                  
18  The specification is similar to Berkowitz and White (2002), Hosono et al. (2004) and 
Hosono and Xu (2009) though Berkowitz and White do not include the bank’s capital 
conditions in the explanatory variables. 
19  Among those firms that were rejected by their main banks, about 20 percent of firms, 
on average, were able to find funds from other financial institutions during 1999-2001. 
We classified these firms as “accepted” firms. 26 
 
legal bankruptcy, past due loans in arrears by six months or more, loans in arrears 
by three months or more and less than six months, and restructured loans. As the 
benchmark of stock prices, we choose March 1993 because the bank stock prices 
were relatively stable and nonperforming loans were not regarded as a severe 
problem at that time. A bank with a high STOCK is expected to be healthier, to 
extend more loans and hence to less frequently reject the client firm. NPL is 
expected to be correlated either negatively or positively with the probability of loan 
rejections. If a bank with a high NPL is poorly capitalized, it should be more 
cautious in screening loan applications. On the other hand, a bank with a high NPL 
may suggest that it has adopted a very lenient screening policy. It may also extend 
loans even to poorly capitalized borrowers (“zombies”) to prevent reported loans 
from increasing. In these cases, NPL should be negatively correlated to the 
probability of loan rejections. 
For the  lationship Re   variables, we use (1) NUMBER: the number of financial 
institutions that the firm deals with, and (2) YEAR: the number of years for which 
the firm has been conducting business with its main bank. A smaller NUMBER and 
a longer YEAR suggest a closer relationship between the firm and its main bank, 
and hence is supposed to result in a lower frequency of loan rejection. 
  The sample statistics of the variables we use are summarized in Table A1. 
 
Results 
     Table A2 presents the estimation results for the marginal effect evaluated at 
the mean value of each dependent variable. The first column shows the results 
when we use only STOCK for  Bank variables. All the coefficients have expected 
signs with high significance levels except for AGE. AGE is strongly correlated with 
YEAR and it takes a negative and significant coefficient if we exclude YEAR from 
the explanatory variables. The second column shows the results when we add NPL 
for  Bank variables. NPL has a significantly negative coefficient. The other 
explanatory variables have expected signs with high significance levels, except for 
AGE. 
     Our goal here is to estimate the share of firms that were financially 
constrained due to their main banks’ unhealthy conditions. It is notable, however, 
that accounting measures of banks are not reliable and sometimes cause a perverse 
effect given the discretionary accounting practices prevalent among Japanese banks 
in the 1990s (Peek and Rosengren, 2005; Hosono and Sakuragawa, 2008). Thus, we 
focus on STOCK to estimate the share of financially constrained firms. By using the 27 
 
coefficient on STOCK (-0.0003) in the first column and multiplying it by the average 
value of STOCK (-35.9 percent), we find that among all sample firms, 1.08 percent 
of firms were rejected due to their main banks’ financial condition. Given that the 
rejected firms occupy 7.42 percent of all firms, we estimate that the number of 
rejected firms increased by 17.1 percent (17.1% = 1.08/(7.42-1.08)) due to the 
deterioration of bank equity value. Using the coefficient of STOCK in column 2, we 
find that the number of rejected firms increased by 23.4 percent. 
 
Estimation of the proportion of financially constrained firms   
     Rejected firms can be safely regarded as financially constrained firms. But 
even among those who do not apply for loans, there must be some firms who wanted 
to borrow but are discouraged due to high financial intermediation costs (just like 
discouraged workers, who do not search for jobs anticipating a low likelihood of 
finding a job). We assume that the ratio of the number of “discouraged” firms to the 
number of rejected firms is constant over time. Then, the number of financially 
constrained firms should increase at the same rate as the number of rejected firms. 
Consequently, we estimate that the number of financially constrained firms 
increase by the range of 17 percent to 23 percent due to high financial 
intermediation costs during the crisis period. 28 
 
Appendix 3. Solution Methods 
    We adopt the following numerical solution methods based on Gomes (2002). 
 
1. Given an arbitrary initial value of w, we solve the Bellman equation for the firm, 
(10), and compute the optimal decision rule, using the value function iteration 
method. We divide the space for capital stock into 101 grid points between zero and 
the upper bound that is chosen so as to be non-binding. The space for productivity 
shocks is divided into 9 points. 
 
2. Using the value function obtained in Step 1, we determine w that satisfies the 
free entry condition (15) for B>0. 
 
3. Using the optimal decisions rules obtained in Step 1, we iterate the law of motion 
for  μ , (16), to compute the stationary measure  μ  with  B = 1. 
 
4. Using the market clearing conditions (31) or (32), we determine the equilibrium 
level of entry B and the corresponding stationary measure  μ . 
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  αk 0.3 Degree of returns to scale
  αl 0.65 Labor share
  δ 0.1 Investment to capital ratio
  ｆ 0.01 Turnover ratio
Technology Shock
  ρ 0.6 Serial correlation of I/K 
  σ 0.05 Std. dev of I/K 
Financing Costs
  λ0 0.035 Share of financially constrained firms
  λ1 0.022 Interest rate margins between bank loans and deposits
Preferences
  β 1/1.03 Interest rate





Table 2. Aggregate Results: Benchmark Economy
Variable Japanese Benchmark 
 1980-95 Economy
Matched quantities
  Investment rate I/K 0.113 0.095
  Firm turnover rate (Entry) 0.061 0.058
Other quantities
  Investment share I/Y 0.225 0.222
  Cash flow / Y 0.341 0.323
  Share of financing costs  Λ/Y 0.039 0.013
  Tobin's Q 2.058 1.092
(1.443)
Notes.   
1. The Tobin's Q value in the parentheses is the average over 
    the period exculding the "bubble" period (1987-92).




Table 3. Cross-Sectional Results: Benchmark Economy
Share Inv. Share K Share I/K I/Y CF/Y Λ/Y Y/L Q Ln(TFP) K
External Finance 0.012 0.965 0.004 2.572 3.736 0.330 0.182 1.623 1.305 0.176 0.474
Financially Constrained 0.618 0.652 0.574 0.107 0.230 0.325 0.000 1.611 1.122 0.042 0.551
Unconstrained 0.312 -0.262 0.384 -0.064 -0.170 0.326 0.000 1.615 1.044 -0.026 0.730
Exit 0.058 -0.355 0.037 -0.900 -3.157 0.303 0.000 1.560 0.986 -0.116 0.485
Note. CF and Λ dnote cash flow and financial costs, respectively.





Table 4. Financially Constrained Economies
Variable Benchmark Constrained Change from Constrained Change from Japanese economy
Economy Economy A Benchmark Economy B Benchmark 1980-1995 1996-2002
A. Financial Costs
Fixed cost of external finance (λ 0) 0.035 0.040 0.005 0.035 0.000
Unit cost of external finance (λ 1) 0.022 0.022 0.000 0.039 0.017
B. Share of Firm Types
External Finance 0.012 0.007 -0.005 0.005 -0.007
Financially Constrained 0.618 0.737 0.119 0.835 0.217
Unconstrained 0.312 0.216 -0.096 0.132 -0.181
Exit 0.058 0.040 -0.018 0.029 -0.029
C. Aggregate Results
Investmetn Ratio ( I/K) 0.095 0.096 0.002 0.097 0.002 0.113 0.092
Investment share (I/Y) 0.222 0.228 0.006 0.228 0.006 0.225 0.222
Cashflow share (CF/Y) 0.323 0.323 0.000 0.321 -0.003 0.341 0.295
Log (Y/L) 0.474 0.472 -0.002 0.464 -0.010 0.009 -0.009
Firm turnover rate (Entry) 0.058 0.040 -0.018 0.029 -0.029 0.061 0.044
Log( Real Wage) (log(W)) 0.084 0.081 -0.003 0.078 -0.006 0.010 0.023
Log(TFP) 0.015 0.011 -0.004 0.009 -0.006 0.007 -0.012
Note: 
1. Log(TFP)  and Log(Real Wage) for the Japanese economy are the detrended average levels.




Table 5. Financially Constrained Economies with Differential Financial Costs between Entrants and Incumbents
Variable Benchmark Constrained Change from Constrained Change from Japanese economy
Economy Economy C Benchmark Economy D Benchmark 1980-1995 1996-2002
A. Financial Costs
Fixed cost of external finance (λ 0) for incumbents 0.035 0.035 0.000 0.035 0.000
                                                   for entrants 0.035 0.040 0.005 0.035 0.000
Unit cost of external finance (λ 1)  for incumbents 0.022 0.022 0.000 0.022 0.000
                                                  for entrants 0.022 0.022 0.000 0.039 0.017
B. Share of Firm Types
External Finance 0.012 0.007 -0.005 0.009 -0.002
Financially Constrained 0.618 0.737 0.119 0.833 0.215
Unconstrained 0.312 0.216 -0.096 0.138 -0.174
Exit 0.058 0.040 -0.018 0.020 -0.039
C. Aggregate Results
Investmetn Ratio ( I/K) 0.095 0.096 0.002 0.098 0.003 0.113 0.092
Investment share (I/Y) 0.222 0.228 0.006 0.231 0.009 0.225 0.222
Cashflow share (CF/Y) 0.323 0.323 0.000 0.320 -0.003 0.341 0.295
Log (Y/L) 0.474 0.472 -0.002 0.464 -0.010 0.009 -0.009
Firm turnover rate (Entry) 0.058 0.040 -0.018 0.020 -0.039 0.061 0.044
Log( Real Wage) (log(W)) 0.084 0.081 -0.003 0.078 -0.006 0.010 0.023
Log(TFP) 0.015 0.011 -0.004 0.007 -0.008 0.007 -0.012
Note: 
1. Log(TFP)  and Log(Real Wage) for the Japanese economy are the detrended average levels.




Table A1. Variables in Coporate Finance Survey
Variable No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Rejection of Loan Applications
R dummy that takes 1 if the loan application is rejected 12569 0.07423 0.262156
Firm 
EBITDA 12569 4.887 7.970
SALES sales/ total assets 12569 1.493332 1.164877
DEBT debt / total assets 12569 0.777794 0.231922
SIZE logarithm of the number of workers 12569 3.692509 1.037867
AGE firm age 12569 40.85257 21.80731
BUSINESS business condition: better or unchagned=1, worse =0 12569 0.614448 0.486745
Main Bank
STOCK rate of change in stock prices from March, 1993 10519 -35.9448 23.79753
NPL non-performing loans / total loans 12569 3.810169 1.861728
Firm-Bank Relationship
NUMBER number of financial institutions that the firm deals with 12569 4.333042 3.291917
YEAR number of years for which the firm deals with the main bank 12569 30.46233 15.02379   
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EBITDA -0.0011 ** -0.0011 **
(0.0002) (0.0002)
SALES -0.0165 ** -0.0167 **
(0.0024) (0.0024)
DEBT 0.0955 ** 0.0959 **
(0.0079) (0.0079)




BUSINESS -0.0521 ** -0.0523 **
(0.0048) (0.0048)
Bank





NUMBER 0.0022 ** 0.0022 **
(0.0006) (0.0006)
YEAR -0.0007 ** -0.0007 **
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Psudo R2 0.130 0.131
No. of Obs. 10519 10519




1. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes unity if the firm's loan application  is rejected and  zero otherwise.
2. The coefficients denote the marginal probability evaluated at the mean value of the explanatory variables
    For BUSINESS dummy, it is for discrete change  from 0 to 1.
3. Numbers in theparentheses are standard errors.
4. ** and * denote the significance levels at 1% and 5%, respectively.
Panel B:
5. Rate of increase in the number of rejected firms due to a decrease in bank stock price
   = Coeffcieints on STOCK x  Average STOCK 
    / (Average proportion of loan rejections -Coefficient on STOCK x Average STOCK)   
41 
 
Figure 1. Non-performing loans of Japanese banks 
 
Source: Financial Service Agency. The non-performing loan ratios are as of March of each year.  
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Note: Turnover ratio of establishments with emploees 
Source: Ministry of Welfare and Labor, “Employment Insurance Annuals.”    
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Figure 3. TFP in Japan 
 
 
Note: The market economy sector in JIP Database 2008. The TFP level in 1980 is normalized to unity.  
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Figure 4. Share of Investment in GDP 
 
 
Note: The market economy sector in JIP Database 2008.  
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Figure 5. Sequence of Events 
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Figure 6. Financing Costs 
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Figure 7. Interest Margins of Japanese Banks 
 
Note: Interest margins = average loan interest rate – average deposit interest rate 
Source: Nikkei Financial Quest 
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  Figure 8. Optimal Capital Accumulation in Benchmark Economy 
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